Introduction
Adam Smith curiously titled his discussion of institutionalized religion in the Wealth of Nations (WN) as, "Of the Expence of the institutions for the Instruction of People of All Ages," government, as well as against the liberty, reason, and happiness of mankind" . In many ways, the Church's survival seems-as it probably did to Smith-"miraculous" (Minowitz 1993,176) . How did the Church maintain its power as both the monopoly provider of religious services but also as a principal gatekeeper to European political and economic development?
Although he does not ask this question explicitly, Smith's approach to religion directly relates to his theory of European development, a topic of great conversation amongst Smith scholars. Despite plentiful literature on the clergy (Anderson 1988; Griswold 1999 , Lindgren 1974 , Minowitz 1993 and the organization of the Roman Catholic Church (Anderson 1988; Minowitz 1993, Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison 2006) , scholars have largely overlooked the role that religious institutions play in Smith's theory of development (but see Anderson 1988 :1074 and Kennedy 2005 . 2 Scholars provide no clear answer to the questions about Smith's views about how the medieval Church managed to accomplish many goals simultaneously; namely, sustain its remarkable long-term monopoly over the provision of religious services, protect itself and its prerogatives against the violence of the secular lords, but also why the Church was so hostile to commerce. These seem particularly pressing questions given Smith's preoccupation with the simultaneity of political and economic freedom in order to spur economic growth, as evidenced in Book III of the Wealth of Nations. This paper demonstrates not only the unique content of Smith's answers to these questions, but the power of his approach that has been overlooked in general Smith scholarship, 2 Additionally, various scholars have explored Smith's concerns about the relationship between the Church and the masses (Minowitz 1993; 169) , the nature of religious services sought by the people, or, in economic terms, the demand for religious services (Anderson 1988 , Griswold 1999 ; as well the role that religion plays in morality more generally (Anderson 1988; Griswold 1999; Haakonssen 1981; Lindgren 1973 , Muller 1993 namely, what some scholars have termed the "industrial organization" of the Church (Anderson 1988 , Ekelund, Hébert, and Tollison 2006 , and Ekelund, Hébert, Tollison, Anderson, and Davidson 1996 hereinafter AEHT) . In his approaches to both feudalism and the medieval Churchand in modern terms -Smith demonstrates two major results. First, he explains how these institutions created a stable equilibriumthat is, a pattern of interaction in which the major players had no incentive to alter their behavior. This equilibrium lasted for several centuries and suppressed liberty and markets. Second, Smith explains how these institutions fell apart as the forces supporting that equilibrium diminished or disappeared. 3 In addressing these questions, Smith explained how a political accommodation emerged between the secular and ecclesiastic lords, an implicit contract, whereby each respected the other's powers within their respective domain. By drawing on ideas from the new social science of religion (cites), I show how Smith's characterization of the Church's dominance-and its subsequent decline-European social, political, and economic order is a coherent narrative not exclusively of conflict, but of rational cooperation and organization in a context that might often be characterized by low growth and violence.
Smith shows that the stability of the political accommodation between the secular and ecclesiastic lords hinges on a third player, the masses. The masses were a potential source of disorder; for example, by rebelling against their lords. According to Smith, the secular lords were unable to pacify the masses on their own 4 ; and, further, the masses presented an especially powerful threat to the secular lords when the Church encouraged them to confront the lords. The Church gained leverage over the masses because it subsidized them (cites), especially in years of 3 In a companion paper, I develop a theoretic approach to Smith's theory of feudalism that complements the approach of this paper (Weingast 2015a) . 4 "In those great landed estates, the clergy, or their bailiffs, could easily keep the peace without the support or assistance either of the king or of any other person; and neither the king nor any other person could keep the peace there without the support and assistance of the clergy" (WN V.i.g.22:801).
poor harvests, offered comfort in the face of death in this life, and the promise of salvation in the next (Griswold 1999:284-85) . By threatening to withhold these goods and services, the Church gained a powerful grip on the masses.
Generally during this period, the secular and ecclesiastic lords cooperated to exploit the masses. But if a secular lord thought to challenge the Church, the Church encouraged the masses to resist and rebel. Hence, each set of elites had incentives to cooperate with one another so as to keep the masses in a state of dependence, allowing the lords to exploit the masses.
Smith's theory of institutionalized religion forms part of his larger project of an integrated and comprehensive approach to political, economic, and moral development, (cites to others who speak about Smith's overall project). Smith's theoretical approach focuses on two sets of forces that kept this low-growth arrangement in place for several centuries, the violence of the feudal equilibrium (discussed in WN Book III) and the Church's monopoly position as provider of religious services (discussed in WN Book V.i.g).
The Church suppressed liberty and economic growth among the masses because, over time, growth would have afforded the people power and independence, undermining the Church's authority over them, or the Church's "grip" over the masses, as Minowitz (1993:169) emphasizes. This weakening of the Church authority over the people, in turn, would weaken the Church's threat over the secular lords. The Church's long-term survival therefore required that it suppress growth. Keeping the people in a state of dependence rather than of liberty, freedom, and economic growth served the private goals of the ecclesiastic lords. I develop two simple game theory applications to demonstrate the logic of Smith's claims. 5 I will also discuss Smith's views on the breakdown of the Church's grip on the masses and the rise of strong competitors in the Protestant Reformation.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes Smith's views on the industrial organization of the medieval Church and its relationship to the secular powers. Section 3 provides a game theoretic account of Smith's logic of the political accommodation between the secular lords and the Church. Section 4 discusses how religion adapted to changing circumstances; that is, the changing industrial organization of religion. Section 5 models the changes discussed in section 4 as a comparative static result in the game. My conclusions follow.
Smith's Industrial Organization of Religion
To explain the political and economic position of the medieval Church, Smith uses logic that anticipates the modern industrial organization of religion (as Anderson 1988 demonstrated nearly three decades ago). Muller's (1993:154) analysis reflects this assessment: "Smith's analysis of religion in the Wealth of Nations is one of the clearest and perhaps least expected applications of his characteristic approach to the role of institutions in channeling the passions and to the unintended consequences of social action."
Drawing on this modern approach, especially the work of AEHT, this section studies a range of features associated with the medieval Church; namely, the structure of competition and the effects of monopolization; the implications of various religious organizations and institutions; the relationship between ecclesiastical and secular authority; and the major strategic choices made by the organization, such as the activities, services, and products it undertakes, and the nature of the rents that it extracts. 6
Secular lords and the Church
The secular and ecclesiastic lords constituted the lion's share of the medieval elite, especially early on before the rise of the commercial elite. The elite owned most of the land, by far the most important asset in this society. They also depended on the peasants, who were tied to the land, for production. This political accommodation of decentralized power, itself based on the reality of decentralized sources of violence, had two implications: first, no uniform law could be established and enforced in the entire kingdom; second no one enforce political arrangements that could secure peace and cooperation among the lords. This world was violent; the lords "were always at war with each other and often with the king" LJ(A) iv.6,249). Secular lords faced considerable violent competition, both vertical (as when a vassal challenged his lord) and
horizontal (as when one baron challenged another). The feudal hierarchy evolved to allow the lords the ability to defend their property and to project force against other lords, but in this setting, local lords faced great difficulties establishing long-term cooperation, and instead fought each other regularly.
Moreover, "In the infancey of society, as has been often observed, government must be weak and feeble, and it is long before [sic] it's authority can protect the industry of individuals from the rapacity of their neighbours. When people find themselves every moment in danger of being robbed of all they possess, they have no motive to be industrious. There could be little accumulation of stock, because the indolent, which would be the greatest number, would live upon the industrious, and spend whatever they produced. Nothing can be more an obstacle to the progress of opulence" (LJ(B) 522). 8
Violence consumed and dissipated almost all sources of rents in the secular system, including both rents realized and those foregone that could be realized in the absence of violence.
As Smith argues in WN book III, this violent world was poor (see Skinner 1975 and Weingast 2015a) . Violence and predation precluded investment and the prospect for economic growth.
This environment therefore afforded few gains from specialization and exchange. The main agricultural products could not be carried far over land. Attempts to save and invest risked confiscation. "[M]en in this defenceless state naturally content themselves with their necessary subsistence; because to acquire more might only tempt the injustice of their oppressors" (WN III.iii.12:405) . The relative absence of specialization and exchangethe division of labor in Smith's famous phrasedoomed most people to live at the level of subsistence.
In contrast to the secular lords, the Church elite were far more cooperative with each other than the secular elite (WN V.i.g.17:797; see also Anderson 1988 Anderson :1080 Minowitz 1993:170) . "There was always much more union among the clergy than among the lay-lords. The former were under a regular discipline and subordination to the papal authority. The latter were under no regular discipline or subordination, but almost always equally jealous of one another, and of the king" (WN V.i.g.22:801). 9 Intra-Church violence, although not absent, was far less common than violence among the secular lords.
Two factors help us understand the Church's behavior: first, the means by which it pursued its goals of organizational maintenance, securing sufficient power and wealth to survive in a hostile world; and second, the Church's monopoly position. With respect to the first, "The [Church's] great interest is to maintain their authority with the people; and this authority depends upon the supposed certainty and importance of the whole doctrine which they inculcate, and upon the supposed necessity of adopting every part of it with the most implicit faith, in order to avoid eternal misery" (WN V.i.g.17:797). Indeed, as Minowitz (1993:169) observes, "Smith could hardly be more emphatic about religion's grip on the masses."
Turning to the issue of monopolization, Smith explains that the Church's position arose out of times of violent political and religious conflict. The secular parties to this conflict allied with religious organizations, and the success of one side left the favored religious organization in a sufficiently strong position as to "over-awe the chiefs and leaders of their own party" (WN V.i.g.7:791-92). With respect to the "civil magistrate," the first demand of the clergy:
was generally, that he should silence and subdue all their adversaries; and their second [demand] , that he should bestow an independent provision on themselves... In making this demand therefore they consulted their own ease and comfort, without troubling themselves about the effect which it might have in future times upon the influence and authority of their order (WN V.i.g.7:792).
The Church's monopoly in Europe fostered very different behavior than that of the secular lords. For one, its "multinational monopoly" position allowed the Church to form a hierarchy that was, in comparison with the organization of the secular lords, relatively cooperative and powerful (Minowitz 1993:170 ; see also Anderson 1988 Anderson :1080 . The Church coordinated the activity of a great many people who pursued common goals. The Church also commanded substantial resources in the form of tithes from parishioners; benefices, indulgences, and bequests from the wealthy; and from its vast landholdings. Although it sometimes engaged in violence with the secular lords, the Church was far less violent, and different segments of the Church much less frequently fought one another. Moreover, manifest violence in the form of combat among armies was not the principal means by which the Church defended itself from the secular lords.
The secular lords and the Church at once competed and cooperated. Although the lords held obvious military advantages over the Church, the Church possessed a very different stock of weapons with which to defend itself, including resources used to gain and maintain allies among the common people and doctrinal weapons to impose costs on uncooperative secular leaders. The secular lords and the Church also had mutual goals, such as maintaining order, exploiting the masses, salvation, and preserving their property, wealth, and sources of income. Over time, a stable accommodation evolved between the two sources of power, secular and ecclesiastic, which economists call an implicit bargain or contract (Ekelund, Hébert, and Tollison 2006:15) .
A major implication is that, in contrast to the secular lords, the Church accumulated real rents and power. Members of the organization consumed some of these rents; but much of the rents went to the poor in the form of food. The Church exploited its monopoly, being less responsive to the population than otherwise. Interpreting the passage in the head note, Anderson (1988:1080) opines:
Smith was, in effect, accusing the monopoly church of reducing the quality of religion supplied to consumers, whose welfare was reduced as a result. In the same passage he clearly attributes this quality reduction to the selfinterested behavior of the clergy, who extracted monopoly rent from their flock both directly and indirectly by promulgating irrational doctrines that served their own interests. The consumers of religion were badly served by the monopoly purveyor of spiritual guidance, just as in the case of monopolies in the provision of more mundane goods.
Although monopoly religious organizations, such as the medieval Roman Catholic Church, do not literally compete with other organizations, the Church had to worry about the rise of rival organizations. To use language from modern industrial organization, their monopoly is "contestable" by potential entrants (Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1982) . To survive, monopolists must have the tools to prevent or eliminate such rivals. In this environment, the Church activity sought to protect its position, for example, by wiping out competing sects, such as the Cathars in Italy and Southern France in the 13 th century. "Competing entrants in the supply of religion were defined as "heretics" and systematically persecuted" (Anderson 1988 (Anderson :1079 .
To maintain their position, leaders of religion organizations needed to tailor the various attributes of their services to their members (Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison 2006; Iannaconne and Bainbridge 2009) . Put another way, sect and religious leaders to a certain extent tailor their doctrine, morals, and theology to the needs of their members. Failing to do so means that they are less likely to attract or retain members; and hence they are more vulnerable to entry by potential competitors. Similarly, Church leaders also structure their organization and institutions in ways to suit their environment so that they can deliver their services effectively.
As a final issue, Smith did not view the Church as just another feudal fiefdom, but an independent player whose interests and opportunities differed considerably from those of the king and lords in feudal Europe. Smith makes several arguments about the differences. First, as discussed earlier in this section, the secular lords were only loosely hierarchical in the sense that they challenged and fought one another all the time. This violence meant that cooperation was difficult, and no one could enforce peace across all the land.
In contrast, the Church was more hierarchical, coordinating 10s of 1000s of Church officials. In Smith's words, "The clergy of every established church constitute a great incorporation. They can act in concert, and pursue their interest upon one plan and with one spirit, as much as if they were under the direction of one man; and they are frequently too under such direction" (WN V.i.g.17:797). 10 Second, the Church had influence and even command over the peasants in ways feudal lords did not. This command depended on the Church being a very different kind of agent:
provider of standard religious services; charity for the poor (Lindgren 1973**).
Third, although Smith did not put it this way, in his scheme, the Church held the pivotal political position in the feudal system, able to side either with the lords against the peasants or with the peasants against the lords. The Church preferred a coalition with the lords to exploit the peasants. If some lord sought to challenge the Church, the Church would react strongly by 10 Smith puts this point another way: "There was always much more union among the clergy than among the lay-lords. The former were under a regular discipline and subordination to the papal authority. The latter were under no regular discipline or subordination, but almost always equally jealous of one another, and of the king" (WN V.i.g.22:801).
withholding essential services (such as salvation) and mobilizing the peasants against the lord. In short, the Church differed significantly from the feudal lords and cannot be considered just another fief within the feudal system.
Political Exchange and Equilibrium between the Church and the Lords
The medieval setting fostered a mutually beneficial political exchange between the Church and the Lords. I call the exchange political because it involves the distribution of authority and social control between these two entities, including the means of establishing and maintaining political order. 11
On the demand side of the market for religious services, the vast majority of people wanted comfort in times of death, charity in times of difficulty, a community to belong to, morality that supports social order (Griswold 1999:284-85) . On the supply side, consider the Church and the poor. The Church helped comfort and feed the poor. The Church provided valuable services for the poor, namely comfort in the face of death; a community; and a set of moral standards that rose above the emotions of the moment, helping to control the passions and focus activity on ensuring that their world was as best as possible given the constraints of the necessities of life. Second, the Church's revenue was typically "paid in kind, in corn, wine, cattle, poultry, &c." (WN V.i.g.22:801). As this amounted to far more than the clergy could consume themselves, the Church employed it in "extensive charity. Both the hospitality and the charity of the antient clergy, accordingly, are said to have been very great. They ... maintained almost the whole poor of every kingdom" (WN V.i.g.22:801). In return, the poor attended Church and paid the tithes. They also followed the Church's rules, including the moral rules. The 11 Laswell (1966,title) offered a famous mid-twentieth century definition of politics as "who gets what, when, and how." moral and religious teachings emphasized acceptance of the earthly order in exchange for the rewards in the afterlife. 12 Moreover, the Church held an ultimate sanction over the poor. The Church provided eternal salvation, a value that could be withheld (Minowitz 1993:169) .
The exchange between the Church and masses helped pacify the poor:
In the antient state of Europe, before the establishment of arts and manufactures, the wealth of the clergy gave them the same sort of influence over the common people, which that of the great barons gave them over their respective vassals, tenants, and retainers. In the great landed estates, which the mistaken piety both of princes and private persons had bestowed upon the church, jurisdictions were established of the same kind with those of the great barons; and for the same reason. In those great landed estates, the clergy, or their bailiffs, could easily keep the peace without the support or assistance either of the king or of any other person (WN V.i.g.21:800-01, emphasis added).
Second, consider the exchange between the Church and the secular lords. Each generally respected the other's authority in its respective domain. The Church's efforts to pacify the population benefitted the secular lords, providing security and protecting the lords' property and wealth. The Church also provided salvation for the lords. Salvation and protection, in turn, gave the Church leverage over the lords.
In the exchange for the services provided by the clergy, the secular elite respected the Church and its authority in its domain rather than using violence to undermine or remove it.
Further, the lords paid tithes and various benefices, supporting the Church organization and its efforts with the poor. This financial support of the Church became a permanent obligation.
Using modern language, it is clear that Smith's logic constitutes a stable pattern of interaction; that is, an equilibrium (as I demonstrate in the next section). Both parties had incentives to honor and maintain this exchange. The Church had the obvious revenue incentives to serve the Lords' interests, especially in providing salvation and in aiding the secular lords through maintaining order rather serving more exclusively the poor. The lords, in turn, had incentives to maintain this exchange because it helped maintain political order, lowering the probability of an existential threat from violence by the poor. This political exchange thus provided salvation while protecting both the lords' and the Church's property and sources of power and wealth.
Consider the threat of violence from the poor. Violence was a constant possibility, both among the poor and between the poor and the rich. Smith explains the threat from the poor to the rich:
Wherever there is great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many. The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by want, and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions. It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable property, which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many successive generations, can sleep a single night in security. He is at all times surrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can never appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the powerful arm of the civil magistrate continually held up to chastise it. The acquisition of valuable and extensive property, therefore, necessarily requires the establishment of civil government. Where there is no property, or at least none that exceeds the value of two or three days labour, civil government is not so necessary (WN V.i.b.2:709-10).
The logic, just stated in general form, applies to the Church's efforts in pacifying the poor during the Middle Ages. 13 The Church helped sustain this political order, again, pacifying the local population, despite so many living at bare subsistence. Muller (1993,154) makes this point as follows, "For Smith, religion expressed in metaphorical terms the reality that acting justly and beneficently is the source of greatest reward and happiness while acting ignobly brings its own 13 With respect to the Church's role in pacifying violence among the poor, Smith notes that various passions led to problems, such as "Fraud, falsehood, brutality, and violence." These passions raised a dilemma, "The industrious knave cultivates the soil; the indolent good man leaves it uncultivated. Who ought to reap the harvest? who starve, and who live in plenty?" Maintaining political order, including the incentives for people to produce subsistence, required channeling the passions into productive activity so that people work and reap the rewards of their work and refrain from exercising passions and violence to take from a neighbor after failing to work (TMS III.5.9:167-68). punishment... The core truth of religion is that by acting justly and beneficently we fulfill the purposes of our creation. And so, Smith concludes, 'religion [helps enforce] the natural sense of duty'" (Muller 1993; 154, quoting TMS III.5.12:170) .
A final aspect of the political accommodation between secular and ecclesiastic lords is that the Church held various weapons over the secular lords that could be used were the lords to challenge the Church's authority in its domain. If the sovereign sought to challenge the Church's authority, the Church fought back, employing "all the terrors of religion to oblige the people to transfer their alliance to some more orthodox and obedient prince" (WN V.i.g.17:797). Princes who failed to heed this reaction fared poorly:
[D]uring the course of several centuries, the turbulence of the Roman clergy was continually occasioning in every part of Europe, sufficiently demonstrate how precarious and insecure must always be the situation of the sovereign who has no proper means of influencing the clergy of the established and governing religion of his country (WN V.i.g.17:798). 14 Because the Church held both the keys to salvation and the allegiance of the people, its ability to provide the former while pacifying the latter proved a two-edged sword. When the secular lords accommodated and respected the Church's interest, pacification benefitted the lords. But the same power over the people allowed the Church to rally the people against uncooperative or threatening lords. For example, Smith reports that, "when Robert, the second prince of the Capetian race [in France], was most unjustly excommunicated by the court of Rome, his own servants, it is said, threw the victuals which came from his table to the dogs, and 14 Smith elaborates: "Should the sovereign have the imprudence to appear either to deride or doubt himself of the most trifling part of their doctrine, or from humanity attempt to protect those who did either the one or the other, the punctilious honour of a clergy who have no sort of dependency upon him, is immediately provoked to proscribe him as a profane person, and to employ all the terrors of religion in order to oblige the people to transfer their allegiance to some more orthodox and obedient prince. Should he oppose any of their pretensions or usurpations, the danger is equally great. The princes who have dared in this manner to rebel against the church, over and above this crime of rebellion, have generally been charged too with the additional crime of heresy, notwithstanding their solemn protestations of their faith and humble submission to every tenet which she thought proper to prescribe to them. But the authority of religion is superior to every other authority. The fears which it suggests conquer all other fears" (WN V.i.g.17:797-98). refused to taste any thing themselves which had been polluted by the contact of a person in his situation. They were taught to do so, it may very safely be presumed, by the clergy of his own dominions" (WN V.i.g.27:805).
Moreover, in the presence of a serious threat from a lord or king, Church authorities might support an alternative, "more orthodox and obedient prince." Secular lords who challenged the Church's authority therefore risked losing their support, position, honor, wealth, and soul.
Smith concluded that the clergy of an "established church" were dangerous, indeed, potentially "ruinous" for secular authorities who would attempt to use violence against them. Secular lords must instead work with and manage the clergy, and the "means seem to consist altogether in the preferment which he has to bestow upon them" (WN V.i.g.19:799).
Long-Term Economic Consequences
The coalition of secular and ecclesiastic authorities directly affected the medieval society's long-term economic growth and development. As Smith makes clear about feudalism, the violence of the secular lords prevented agrarian economic development; indeed, Smith claimed that this violence forced European political-economic development into an "unnatural and retrograde order" (WN III.i.9:380; see also Hont 1988) . In particular, these arrangements suppressed many economic activities that might have made many much better off and more independent. Because these economic activities threatened the elite, the secular and religious authorities combined to suppress competing ideas, organizations, and economic activities. As Smith suggests in the head note to this paper, the Church represented a formidable barrier to development.
Smith argued that the Church's singular interest was "to maintain their authority with the people" (WN V.i.g.17:797; see also Minowitz 1993,**) . Pursuing these interests, the Church kept the masses in a position of dependency. Its principal tools involved salvation and charity during hard times, such as poor harvests. Moreover, peasants on the Church's vast landholdingsthe Church was by far the biggest landholder in Western Europecould be turned out and their source of livelihood withdrawn. All of these meanssalvation, charity, and (for peasants on the Weingast 2015b ). More generally, Smith's logic fits with a range of recent arguments in the political-economics of economic growth, such as Robinson (2006,2012) , North Wallis and Weingast (2009, ch 2-3), and Cox, North, and Weingast (2015) .
16 Kennedy (2005:40) further observes that Smith, "knew the relevant biblical verses too: 'Lay not up for yourselves the treasures upon the earth, where moth and rust doth consume, and where thieves break through and steal'; 'you cannot serve God and Mammon'; 'And I say unto you, It is easier for a camel to go through a needle's eye, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God';' For what doth it profit a man, to gain the whole world, and forfeit his soul'; 'The Bishop therefore must be without reproach ... no lover of money' (some translations give 'filthy lucre' for money); 'For the love of money is a root of all kinds of evil: which some reaching after have been led astray from faith.' Such themes brook no compromise. For many, the commercial ethos was incompatible (and for some, it still is) with Christian life, and that was that."
In the short-term, economic growth might produce more revenue for the Church; but in the long-term, it would foster the rise of new and powerful groups whose interests opposed those of the Church (I demonstrate this conclusion using a simple game in the next section). For example, had the medieval Church wanted, it could have promoted greater liberty for the people through long-term leases. Indeed, it did just this later in the period as a means of gaining more revenue (cites). Leases granting peasants greater security would have provided them opportunities to improve their production, position, and to accumulate wealth.
Economic development produces new interests as groups formerly without resources come to obtain them. Resources, in turn, produce power. In particular, greater liberty for the masses would allow them independence from both the secular lords and the Church. The masses would accumulate wealth and power, thus limiting their dependence on the Church for their livelihood or for charity in bad times. Independence, in turn, would remove the ability of the Church to manipulate the peasants, ultimately threatening the existing power structure, the Church in particular. Because these interests would constitute a direct threat to the Church, it sought to suppress them.
For these reasons, the Church suppressed liberty, the foundation of markets and wealthor, in Smith's terms, of commerce and opulence. This environment was not hospitable to the enforcement of contracts and the development of markets. Law and justice in medieval society protected the interests of the powerful. Independent courts were unknown. As exercised by both secular and ecclesiastic lords, the provision of justice involved moral hazard: in cases involving themselves or those close to them, both sets of lords biased outcomes in their favor.
Modeling the Political Accommodation between The Secular and Ecclesiastic Lords
This section models as a game Smith's account of the stability of cooperation between the secular and ecclesiastic powers during the Middle Ages. The game relies on Smith's insights into the strategic interests and opportunities of the various players.
The advantages of making the game explicit are fourfold. First, it allows us to see that the behavior of the major groups in society fit together in a common logic. The behavior of each group depends on the behavior of the others, and in a particular manner emphasized by the game.
Second, the game highlights the incentives facing each group to play their role. These incentives are essential to understanding the stability or equilibrium interaction among the groups.
Demonstrating the existence of an equilibrium explains why this pattern of behavior is stable.
Third, the game therefore goes well beyond a verbal discussion of incentives. Because players have mixed motivesfor example, when they gain from cooperation but also have incentives to defectcooperation as an equilibrium is not automatically assured but must be demonstrated.
Finally, the game emphasizes the logic of how authority could be divided between the secular and ecclesiastic lords in which, on balance, the two sets of authorities accommodated one another without constant conflict.
The game has three players, a Local Lord (L) representing the feudal hierarchy of secular lords and their retainers; the Church (C) representing the various elements of the Church hierarchy; and the peasantry or masses (M), largely tied to the land as serfs and most living at subsistence.
Consider the sequence of moves or choices in the game. Because the game has many decision nodes, it has many contingencies that we need to keep track of. L has the first choice and must decide whether to respect C's rights and privileges, including providing revenue to C;
or L may attempt to capture some of C's rights and privileges. C moves next, and its options depend on L's choice (see figure 1 ). If L has chosen to respect C's rights and privileges, C must decide whether to accept L's authority in its domain and, at the same time, provide direct benefits to L, including salvation and pacifying M. Alternatively, C can reject L's authority and, at the same time, withhold salvation and urge the masses to rebel against L. If instead of respecting C's rights and privileges, L has chosen to challenge them, C then has two choices. C can acquiesce to L's challenge and continue to provide salvation and pacify M; or C can resist L, withhold Next, consider the players' preferences over outcomes. The logic of the equilibrium implies that we do not need full preference orders over outcomes. 18 The following assumptions about preferences are sufficient to calculate the equilibrium of the game. First, consider L. L most prefers E (see table 1); that is, to add to its authority by capturing some of C's rights by 17 Uncertainty is implicit in M's choice of rebellion. As is standard, we model this uncertainty as a form of lottery between success and failure of the rebellion; namely, if M rebels, then with probability p the rebellion succeeds; and with probability 1-p the rebellion fails. To simply the analysis, I suppress this lottery, assuming that the players' evaluation of the relevant outcomes are the expected values of the lottery. 18 To see this, observe that at each of the four terminal nodes of the game, M chooses between one of two options. Because the option not chosen by M can never occur, we do not have to know the complete preference orders for L and C; instead, we need only know their preferences over the four choices made by M at the four terminal nodes. Similarly, because M's potential choices are confined to A vs. B, C vs. D, E vs. F, and G vs. H, we need know only M's rankings over these four pairs. Finally, attempting to make complete preference orders requires information not supplied or inferable from Smith's narrative, and hence the choice of preferences would be arbitrary.
Player Preferences

L C M
Best: choosing to challenge C and then have C and M both choose to acquiesce. By a similar logic, the worst outcome is for L to accept C's rights and privileges while C chooses to challenge L's authority backed by withholding salvation while M rebels (recall that when C and M coordinate against L, there is a high probability of success). In particular, L prefers E to A; that is, it prefers gaining from C to respecting C's rights and privileges and having C acquiesce, provide salvation, and pacify M. L also prefers A to H; that is, L prefers that both C and L accept each other's authority to a challenge of C's authority by L that is met by resistance from both C and M.
Finally, L prefers H to D; that is, if C and M choose to resist to L, prefers to have challenged C rather than not having done so. 19 Consider C's preferences. C most prefers outcome A. The reason is that C is best off when L respects C's rights and L subsidizes C, and it accepts L's authority, provides salvation, and pacifies the masses who acquiesce. This ranking presumes that L's subsidy to C is sufficiently larger, an issue I return to below. Although C would prefer to have L choose to respect C's rights while C and M successfully challenge L, the challenge is risky, and C might lose. It therefore prefers A to D. Similarly, C prefers A to B; that is, if L and C accept each other's authority, C prefers that M acquiesce rather than revolt. C also prefers D over C; that is, if L accepts C's rights but C has chosen to challenge L, then L prefers that M revolt rather than acquiesce. A variant on this logic shows that C prefers E to F and H to G. These assumptions about preferences are sufficient to solve the game. We do so using backward induction starting at the four terminal nodes and working backwards. At each decision node, the player making the choice must be able to predict the consequences of its actions with each choice. We therefore need to solve for the choices at every decision node even though the choices made along the equilibrium path will bypass some of the decision notes. Finally, L prefers accepting C's rightsknowing that C will choose to respect its rights, provide salvation, pacify M, and M will acquiesceto challenging C's rights, knowing that C will resist and urge M to rebel and M will rebel. Church choose not to exploit the other because that leads to a costly breakdown of cooperation.
Subsidies from the Lords to the Church represent a critical feature of the game, especially with respect to C's decision not to defect. The preference ranking above presumed that C prefers outcome A to D. For this to hold, the subsidies from L to C must be sufficiently large to overcome C's temptation, where defection means that C chooses to challenge L's authority, withhold salvation, and have masses rebel. Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that if the subsidies to C are too small C prefers to defect, resulting in outcome D. Because D is L's worst alternative, it prefers to subsidize C sufficiently, resulting in outcome A. The gains from cooperation between C and L make this outcome possible. Putting these points together, the strategic incentives of the game induce the Lord to subsidize the Church and reframe from using its comparative advantage in violence against the Church. The Church, in turn, provides essential benefits to the Lord by providing salvation to the Lord while also pacifying the masses and protecting the Lord's property and income.
The Changing Industrial Organization of Religion
How did the Church lose its monopoly position with the rise of powerful, alternative religious organizations during the Reformation? Whereas the Church successfully suppressed competing religious organizations during the Middle Ages, it failed to do so during the Reformation. Smith answers these questions.
Changes in the Environment Erode the Church's Authority
Smith's arguments tie directly to those in Book III of the Wealth of Nations, which studies the stability and then fall of feudalism in response to the rise of commerce, the growth of towns, the political exchange between town and king that granted the towns independence and liberty and the king, more power and authority over the lords. 20 Smith explains how the rise of commerce transformed the feudal hierarchy. Towns provided local security, including disarming local lords. This environment removed the need for the secular lords to maintain a large retinue to defend itself. The towns also offered new opportunities for luxury, which induced the lords to exchange their expensive retainers for consumption on "trinkets and baubles." 21 Similarly with the Church. The clergy discovered new luxury for which they could exchange their revenues. 22
These changes diminished the power and wealth of the local lords, and with it, their contributions to the Church and, ultimately, the power of the Church. At the same time, the Church reduced its charity due to declining revenue and due to increased expenditure on luxury.
Less charity reduced the dependence of the masses on the Church. In reaction, the Church sought additional revenue from its tenants. But, given that the Church's interests already drove it to extract the maximal revenue from the peasantry, raising rents alone would not raise more revenue. Additional revenue required that the Church alter institutions to the benefit of the tenants. The principal means of doing so involved extending long-term leases to the tenants.
While providing additional revenue to the Church, these leases also lowered the risk to tenants, such as the threat of being thrown off the land were the tenants not cooperate with the Church.
Long-term leases also reduced ability of the Church qua landlord to expropriate the value of 20 See references in note 2, infra. 21 The larger passage that contains this quote: "Having sold their birth-right, not like Esau for a mess of pottage in time of hunger and necessity, but in the wantonness of plenty, for trinkets and baubles, fitter to be the play-things of children than the serious pursuits of men, they became … insignificant" (WN III.iv.15:421) . 22 In Smith's words, "The gradual improvements of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the same causes which destroyed the power of the great barons, destroyed in the same manner, through the greater part of Europe, the whole temporal power of the clergy. In the produce of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the clergy, like the great barons, found something for which they could exchange their rude produce, and thereby discovered the means of spending their whole revenues upon their own persons, without giving any considerable share of them to other people. Their charity became gradually less extensive, their hospitality less liberal or less profuse. Their retainers became consequently less numerous, and by degrees dwindled away altogether" (WN V.i.g.25:803).
investments made by tenants (WN V.i.g.25:803) . 23 Smith concludes that these changes diminished the Church's power, "The ties of interest, which bound the inferior ranks of people to the clergy, were in this manner gradually broken and dissolved" (WN V.i.g.25:803-04). 24
The Rise of Competition among Religions
A variety of institutional and organizational changes also occurred in this environment.
Recall that the Church's monopoly was not permanent but contestable. New and powerful religious sects grew up to challenge the Church's authority in the form of the protestant reformation. Moreover, in many states that continued to maintain a Catholic monopoly, such as France, the secular authorities asserted more authority over the Church within its domain; for example, control over the choices of bishops and the abbots, which diminished the independence of the Church.
In the faces of these changes, the people no longer "looked upon that order, as they had done before, as the comforters of their distress, and the relievers of their indigence. On the contrary, they were provoked and disgusted by the vanity, luxury, and expence of the richer clergy, who appeared to spend upon their own pleasures what had always before been regarded 23 The editors (WN V.i.g.25:803) cite Smith's argument (LJ (A) iii.121;189), " that the clergy encouraged the relaxation of the authority of the great proprietors over their villeins as a means of reducing their power and that: 'They saw too perhaps that their lands were but very ill cultivated when under the management of these villains. They therefore thought it would be more for their own advantage to emancipate their villains and enter into an agreement with them with regard to the cultivation of their lands. In this manner slavery came to be abollished.'" 24 As a matter of timing, Smith states that the Church's power decline antedated the decline in power of the temporal lords. The "ties of interest" that bound the masses to the Church: "were even broken and dissolved sooner than those which bound the same ranks of people to the great barons: because the benefices of the church being, the greater part of them, much smaller than the estates of the great barons, the possessor of each benefice was much sooner able to spend the whole of its revenue upon his own person. During the greater part of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the power of the great barons was, through the greater part of Europe, in full vigour. But the temporal power of the clergy, the absolute command which they had once had over the great body of the people, was very much decayed. The power of the church was by that time very nearly reduced through the greater part of Europe to what arose from her spiritual authority; and even that spiritual authority was much weakened when it ceased to be supported by the charity and hospitality of the clergy" (WN V.i.g.25:803-04).
as the patrimony of the poor" (WN V.i.g.25:804). As I have shown, Church institutions during the Middle Ages created dependency of the masses on the Church, allowing the Church to exploit them but also to force them to support the Church against secular authorities when the latter sought to challenge the Church. The institutional changesless charity from the Church, lower revenue to the Church from the secular lords, long-term leases granting the masses greater independencealtered the masses' incentives. Less dependence on the Church meant that the poor had fewer incentives to adhere to the Church's demands. Diminished incentives, in turn, altered the relationship between the secular and ecclesiastic lords: "As the clergy had now less influence over the people, so the state had more influence over the clergy. The clergy therefore had both less power and less inclination to disturb the state" .
In short, a series of factors combined to weaken the Church relative to the secular lords.
This provides the background to understanding the rise of competitive religious sects.
Implications for the Changing Industrial Organization of Religion: The Rise of Competition
Smith's argument about the rise of competition during the Reformation is an extension of the argument just discussed and the change in relative power between secular lords and the Church. In Smith's view, the secular lords gained power at the expense of the Church before the 25 Their austerity generated support among the people, provided a striking contrast with that of the Church. 26 The Church's reduced generosity combined with the appearance of selfindulgence and lavishness to put it at a further disadvantage. Indeed, the established Church seemed ill-prepared to deal with the new competitors and their alliances with local princes.
In many areas, the new doctrines succeed, especially where the princes had been on bad terms with the Church. "The court of Rome had disobliged some of the smaller princes in the northern parts of Germany, whom it had probably considered as too insignificant to be worth the managing. They universally, therefore, established the reformation in their own dominions" (WN V.i.g.30:806) . In England, Henry VIII took advantage of the weakened Church.
[T]hough he did not embrace himself the greater part of the doctrines of the reformation, was yet enabled, by their general prevalence, to suppress all the monasteries, and to abolish the authority of the church of Rome in his dominions. That he should go so far, though he went no further, gave some satisfaction to the patrons of the reformation, who 25 "The teachers of those doctrines, though perhaps in other respects not more learned than many of the divines who defended the established church, seem in general to have been better acquainted with ecclesiastical history, and with the origin and progress of that system of opinions upon which the authority of the church was established, and they had thereby some advantage in almost every dispute" (WN V.i.g.29:805) . 26 "The austerity of their manners gave them authority with the common people, who contrasted the strict regularity of their conduct with the disorderly lives of the greater part of their own clergy. They possessed too in a much higher degree than their adversaries, all the arts of popularity and of gaining proselytes, arts which the lofty and dignified sons of the church had long neglected, as being to them in a great measure useless" having got possession of the government in the reign of his son and successor, completed without any difficulty the work which Henry VIII. had begun (WN V.i.g.31:806) .
Smith also observed that the decentralized nature of the Reformation had important consequences for governance of the new sects, including a degree of competition that the Catholic Church had stifled. When doctrinal disputes arose, for example, the absence of a central authority made it difficult to settle them. Unlike the centralized hierarchy of the Catholic Church, the decentralized, competitive nature of the new sects meant the absence of a mechanism to adjudicate disputes about doctrine.
When the followers of the reformation in one country, therefore, happened to differ from their brethren in another, as they had no common judge to appeal to, the dispute could never be decided; and many such disputes arose among them. Those concerning the government of the church, and the right of conferring ecclesiastical benefices, were perhaps the most interesting to the peace and welfare of civil society. They gave birth accordingly to the two principal parties or sects among the followers of the reformation, the Lutheran and Calvinistic sects, the only sects among them, of which the doctrine and discipline have ever yet been established by law in any part of Europe (WN V.i.g.33:806).
One feature of this decentralization is that it allowed members of the same sect but in different secular realms to sustain doctrinal differences. This, in turn, allowed them to adapt their doctrine to the needs of their members in a manner not possible within the monopoly medieval Church.
Moreover, the logic of decentralization combined with the political structure (small or large secular states) to affect the political and organizational structure of the new sects.
The followers of Luther, together with what is called the church of England, preserved more or less of the episcopal government, established subordination among the clergy, gave the sovereign the disposal of all the bishopricks, and other consistorial benefices within his dominions, and thereby rendered him the real head of the church; and without depriving the bishop of the right of collating to the smaller benefices within his diocese, they, even to those benefices, not only admitted, but favoured the right of presentation both in the sovereign and in all other lay-patrons (WN V.i.g.34:806) .
The alliance between the princes and the new sects led each to support the other in the face of existential threats from the Catholic Church. Violent disputes between secular and religious authorities would advantage their mutual enemies, giving both sets of authorities to cooperate. As Smith concludes, "This system of church government was from the beginning favourable to peace and good order, and to submission to the civil sovereign" (WN V.i.g.34:806).
Modeling the Response of the Political Accommodation between The Secular and Ecclesiastic Lords as a Comparative Statics
The game described in section 4 demonstrated the existence of an equilibrium in the political accommodation between the secularly and ecclesiastic lords. The main implication was that both parties to the political accommodation had incentives to cooperate with one another;
that is, to respect the rights, privileges, and powers of the other. In terms of the game, these trends reinforced one another. As their effects cumulated, at some point they grew sufficiently strong as to alter the payoffs and hence the equilibrium of the game. The political accommodation during the Middle Ages depended on the threat of M to L and on the ability of C to pacify or mobilize M. This ability, in turn, kept L in check so that L chose to respect rather than challenge C's authority.
The environmental changes had the following implications for the players' preferences.
With chosen to respect C's rights, C prefers to accept L's authority and to attempt to pacify M. If L has chosen to reject C's authority, C prefers to reject L's authority and to urge M to rebel. Finally, at the first decision node, and knowing the full consequences of his actions, L must choose between respecting or rejecting part or all of C's authority. 27 The first choice leads to outcome A while the second, to G. Because L prefers G over A -it has captured some or all of C's authority -L will choose to reject C's authority. Along the equilibrium path, the players make the following choices: L chooses to reject C's authority; C rejects L's authority and urges M to challenge; and M chooses to acquiesce rather than challenge L's authority. 27 An interesting question is what determines analyze the secular leaders' choice between rejecting the Church's authority in part or in toto? As Smith makes no attempt to answer this question, we leave the question unanswered and interpret L's choice in a binary fashion. 
Conclusions
Adam Smith argued that two sets of interrelated medieval institutions hindered the long-term economic development of medieval Europe, feudalism and the Catholic Church. Smith's ideas on the first are relatively well-known, while those on the second considerably less so.
In an effort to help right this imbalance, I develop in this paper the logic of Smith's approach. Smith addresses a series of questions about the Church: how the secular and ecclesiastic authorities maintained their separate powers; why the secular authorities not only refrained from using their comparative advantage in violence to capture some or all of the Church's authority but also subsidized their ecclesiastic rivals; and why the Church's interests led it to suppress liberty and economic growth.
The Church's principal interest, as with almost all organizations, was to maintain itself and, in this case, its monopoly position (as the work of Anderson, Ekelund, Iannaccone, Hébert, Tollison, Stark and Bainbridge, among others, in the new social science of religion argue). In particular, Smith suggests that the Church sought to maintain its authority with the people. The approach of this paper demonstrates why this authority was so central to the Church's survival.
Smith answers the principal questions by explaining the interaction of three groups, the secular lords, the ecclesiastical lords, and the people. The political exchange underlying the feudal society of the 10th-14th centuries involved the accommodation of the Church and secular lords with one another. In simple terms, the Church helped pacify the population of poor, rural peasants, tailoring its doctrines to this purpose. They supported the secular authority, including the very unequal distribution of land and wealth. In return the secular lords financed the Church and respected its authority within its realm. Both sides had incentives to maintain this bargain and hence to accept one another's authority within their respective realms.
The Church also maintained the people in a position of dependence through a variety of weapons. For example, Smith argued that its charity maintained most of the poor; the Church provided religious services, such as salvation and comfort in times of death; and, for those peasants living on Church land, their tenancy at will allowed the Church to throw them off the land. These weapons afforded the Church a credible threat over the people; those who failed to heed its interest risked dire consequences.
Smith's logic implies that this pattern of interaction was a stable equilibrium. Were a secular lord to attempt to challenge the Church's authority, the Church would bring all its weapons to bear in retaliation. The Church would brand the lord as heretical; it would withhold its services, such as salvation; and, instead of pacifying the people, it would rally them against the lord. In the face of these threats, most lords did not challenge the Church, and those that did challenge typically backed down.
Smith's approach also affords an explanation for the rise of religion competition during 
